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ABSTRACT 
Foreign Direct Investment, Competitive Pressure and Spillovers.  
An Empirical Analysis of Spanish Firm Level Data* 
A short review of the theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has the potential to increase the intensity of 
competition as well as to act as a channel for technology transfers. One would 
expect, all else equal, an increase in average firm performance following a 
wave of FDI, as multinational corporations (MNCs) enjoy higher levels of 
efficiency and have the potential to generate positive spillovers. At the same 
time, the entry of foreign firms has also been associated with an increase in 
competitive pressure on the domestic market. Using a large firm level dataset 
covering all sectors of Spanish manufacturing during the period 1983-96, we 
disentangle these three effects by estimating a dynamic model of firm level 
performance, which we proxy by profitability. We find that FDI has a positive 
long-run effect on the profitability of target firms, but this is limited to firms 
belonging to R&D intensive sectors. In addition, the results indicate that 
foreign presence dampens margins. However, this effect appears to be more 
than compensated by positive spillovers in the case of knowledge intensive 
industries. 
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1 Introduction
The explanations put forward to account for the observed patterns of foreign
investment (FDI) are drawn from trade theory, industrial organisation, and the
international business literature. Dunning’s (1981) eclectic paradigm attempts
to bring these di¤erent strands of the literature together, and it remains a
standard reference for scholars studying FDI. His approach, typically referred
to as the Ownership-Localisation-Internalisation (OLI) paradigm, stresses that
three factors must be present for FDI to occur.
First, the potential or actual multinational must be endowed with some …rm-
speci…c ownership advantage not available to host country …rms. The original
idea is due to Hymer (1976), and it is commonly accepted as a necessary condi-
tion for FDI to occur. Second, there must be localisation advantages associated
with foreign production. Third, internalisation advantages determine the choice
of FDI as opposed to arm’s length market transactions, such as licensing agree-
ments, which may entail the di¤usion of the multinational’s assets to actual or
potential competitors.1
The e¤ect of FDI on host economies has been the subject of extensive re-
search. As pointed out by Hanson (2001), both theory and empirical evidence
provide mixed results on the net welfare e¤ect of inward FDI on recipient coun-
tries. This is not so surprising, as theoretical models have identi…ed a large
number of FDI induced e¤ects on product and factor markets that all contribute
to alter welfare. In an early pioneering contribution, Caves (1974) conjectured
that FDI in‡uenced host country conditions through two main channels. On the
one hand, FDI ought to result in technology transfers to host country …rms. On
the other hand, an important foreign presence could also increase the intensity
1 See Markusen (1995) for a discussion.
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of competition in the recipient country. By and large, the empirical literature
has focused on the …rst of these two e¤ects, possibly because unearthing the
pro-competitive e¤ect of FDI is not trivial.
The fact that MNCs are endowed with …rm speci…c advantages that can eas-
ily be transferred across locations suggest that subsidiaries ought to enjoy higher
levels of e¢ciency, and therefore pro…tability, compared to domestic …rms. It is
also a common observation that MNCs have the potential to generate positive
spillovers in the host location (see Blomström and Kokko (1998) for a survey).
This suggests that industries that are characterised by a high degree of knowl-
edge spillovers and an increase in the degree of foreign presence might display
higher levels of pro…tability. However, recent empirical evidence has cast doubts
on the importance of these spillovers (see Hanson (2001) for an overview, and
Aitken and Harrison (1999) for evidence pertaining to Venezuela).
As mentioned above, increased competition also …gures among the many ef-
fects attributed to FDI (Caves (1974)). Depending on the mode of foreign entry
and industry structure, the presence of MNCs may well increase competitive
rivalry. While this conjecture is intuitively appealing, direct empirical evidence
of the pro-competitive e¤ect of FDI is limited, if not non-existent.2
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to disentangle empirically the ef-
…ciency, spillovers, and competition e¤ects of FDI on …rms’ pro…tability. We
chose pro…tability as a proxy for …rm performance for two main reasons. First,
pro…tability is a natural choice when attempting to gauge changes in compet-
itive pressure. Second, this variable is less prone to measurement problems
2 In his industry level study, Caves (1974) found that the pro…tability of Canadian domestics
plants during the period 1965-67 was negatively correlated with the average share of foreign
plants in industry sales. This …nding was interpreted as evidence of the pro-competitive e¤ect
of FDI. Clearly, this …nding cannot be given a causal interpretation. Aitken and Harrison
(1999) address a di¤erent, but closely related issue, namely the relationship between the
degree of MNC activity and the productivity of domestically owned concerns. Their …ndings
is that MNC “crowd-out” domestic concerns, leading to lower productivity.
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stemming from the use of industry wide de‡ators, as it directly re‡ects …rms’
pricing behaviour.
The issue is not trivial, as the these forces operate in opposite directions.
On the one hand, the existence of …rm speci…c intangible assets on the part of
MNCs should result in higher pro…tability for foreign subsidiaries. In addition,
the possible existence of positive FDI related spillovers in an industry should
increase the average pro…tability of host country …rms (these two hypotheses are
discussed in more detail in the next section). The …rst e¤ect is direct: MNCs
transfer their intangibles internally, thus increasing the e¢ciency of subsidiaries,
while the second is indirect as it works its way through spillovers. By contrast,
the pro-competitive e¤ect of FDI ought to depress the margins of …rms that
operate in industries that are characterised by an important foreign presence.
Thus, distinguishing the relative importance of these opposing forces requires
a careful empirical analysis. Furthermore, these e¤ects may not necessarily be
felt contemporaneously.
The main innovations contained in this paper are as follows. First, we use
dynamics as our main identi…cation argument. Concretely, we conjecture that
the e¤ects identi…ed above will work their way through at a di¤erent pace.
Second, we split our sample using R&D intensity, which provides an additional
identifying hypothesis. Third, we use the identity of …rms as a further check on
the robustness of our results. Since Spanish owned …rms typically lag foreign
subsidiaries along the technological dimension, domestic …rms (as opposed to
foreign subsidiaries) are likely to be the main bene…ciaries of spillovers. Fourth,
we apply the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) in order to deal with
endogeneity biases. This also allows us to properly account for industry and
…rm level …xed e¤ects. As shown by Aitken and Harrison (1999), failing to
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control for industry and …rm level …xed e¤ects can yield spurious results. Last,
we checked that our …ndings are consistent with estimates obtained with labour
productivity, another standard measure of …rm performance.
We …nd that after controlling for potential endogeneity biases, FDI has a
positive long-run e¤ect on the pro…tability of target …rms, but this is limited
to R&D intensive sectors. In addition, domestically owned …rms are the main
recipient of spillovers in knowledge intensive industries. Last, the results indicate
that an important foreign presence dampens margins, at least in the short run.
However, in the case of R&D intensive industries, this appears to be more than
compensated by positive spillovers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section indicates why,
under fairly general conditions, FDI could be expected to act as a channel for
technology transfers as well as in‡uence the intensity of competition. Section
3 presents the data and describes how we constructed the variables. Section
4 contains the econometric speci…cation as well the main results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Motivation and testable hypotheses
2.1 Technology transfers
The fact that MNCs possess …rm-speci…c assets that confer them a competitive
edge is well established in the literature (Markusen (1995)). By their very
nature, these assets can be easily transferred back and forth across space. As
such, this suggests that foreign owned …rms will be more e¢cient and, as a
general rule, more pro…table.3 It could of course be the case that the change
3 In a wide class of models, a drop in costs leads to an increase in margins. A …rm’s Lerner
index ((p¡ c)=p) is determined by the elasticity of the residual demand it faces. Except in the
particular case of an iso-elastic residual demand, a drop in costs accompanied by a downward
adjustment in prices (leading to larger sales) results in a fall in the elasticity of the residual
demand faced by the …rm.
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in ownership from domestic to foreign leaves e¢ciency unchanged. This would
occur if the MNC decides not to transfer any …rm speci…c assets to its subsidiary.
There are nonetheless situations in which a change in ownership may result
in a drop in pro…tability, at least in the short-run. If there are important costs
associated with the change in management, pro…tability may initially drop.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) report that plants changing owners experienced
a drop in productivity compared to plants that did not. In addition, the liter-
ature on mergers and acquisitions also provides evidence that merged entities
(irrespective of whether they involve a foreign partner) sometimes underperform
their rivals. If these “teething problems” are real, a change of ownership from
domestic to foreign is likely to be more costly compared to a situation only in-
volving domestic entities. This may result from di¤erences in culture, language,
access to public authorities, or an inadequate knowledge of consumer prefer-
ences, that is, there may be speci…c disadvantages associated to “foreignness”
(Harris and Robinson (2002)).4
The empirical literature on these issues is mixed. On the one hand, the
superior performance of foreign owned …rms has been widely documented and
has become a “stylised fact” in the literature on MNCs (Conyon et al. (2002)).
However, recent empirical work where endogeneity problems are controlled for
casts more than a passing doubt on whether this “stylized fact” can be given
a causal or structural interpretation. For instance, using a panel of Italian
…rms Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) report evidence that, in the aggregate,
a change in ownership from domestic to foreign has no e¤ect on the productivity
4A fall in the target …rm’s pro…tability may also occur when FDI is driven by a technology
sourcing. This conjecture has received both theoretical and empirical support (for theoretical
results, see Fosfuri and Motta (1999), Siotis (1999), and for empirical evidence Neven and
Siotis (1996), Dri¢eld and Love (2003)). However, while sourcing may be a realistic motive,
its importance is likely to be very limited compared to “traditional” FDI, particularly in the
context of Spain.
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of the target. However, they also …nd that nationality matters since subsidiaries
under US ownership tend to be more productive than …rms under domestic
ownership. In turn, this result points out that the transfer of knowledge implied
by internalisation theory materialises only if the gap between the recipient and
the investing country is su¢ciently pronounced.
As mentioned above, FDI is believed to generate positive spillovers for do-
mestically owned concerns (see Blomström and Kokko (1998) for an extensive
survey). Under this scenario, FDI would act as a channel for technology trans-
fers for all …rms operating in the industry (and not only the ones that are foreign
owned).5 However, this conjecture has received mixed empirical support in a
number of recent papers using …rm level data (see, among others, Haddad and
Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison (1999), and Hanson (2001) for a discus-
sion).
2.2 Competition
Conceptually, identifying the pro-competitive e¤ect of FDI is more complex, as
it is possible to imagine a myriad of di¤erent situations. In what follows, we limit
ourselves to cases that can be interpreted within the framework of our empirical
estimations. Empirically, the bulk of FDI is “horizontal” and concentrated in
sectors were product di¤erentiation is pervasive, i.e. imperfectly competitive
industries characterised by entry barriers such as …xed costs that are often sunk
(and may be endogenous or exogenous). Since MNCs are …rms that already
operate in a foreign market, and have presumably already incurred …xed costs,
they are in a privileged position to compete with established domestic concerns.
5To the extent that the presence of foreign …rms increases the degree of price competition in
an industry (see sub-section 2.2), an increased foreign presence is expected to have a negative
e¤ect on domestic …rms’ pro…tability. However, if technological spillovers are important, this
downward pressure on pro…tability will be dampened by the positive e¤ect that the spillover-
induced reduction in production costs exerts on domestic …rms’ pro…tability.
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From that perspective, an MNC is better positioned compared to a potential
entrant with no previous experience (which explains why it is MNCs, and not
a domestic entrant, that successfully erode the rents enjoyed by established
domestic concerns). This conjecture applies to both vertically and horizontally
di¤erentiated industries.
A related argument pertaining to the e¤ect of FDI on competitive outcomes
is provided by Boone (2000). His analysis focuses on di¤erent parametrisations
of competition. He shows that one of the few robust results is that competitive
pressure ought to increase monotonically with marginal cost asymmetries across
…rms. His results obtain under a wide variety of parametrisations (e.g. Cournot
vs. Bertrand). As a consequence, if FDI results in e¢ciency gains for the sub-
sidiary, then it will generate a ceteris paribus increase in competitive pressure,
at least in the short-run.
These results hold even if the MNC was exporting to the domestic market
prior to the investment decision. In that case, the pro-competitive e¤ect will be
lessened, but it will not disappear altogether. The reason is that the elimina-
tion of transport costs allows the MNC to engage in more competitive pricing
compared to a situation where it has to export.6
In addition, the change in ownership from domestic to foreign may result
in important changes in the behaviour of the subsidiary. If prior to FDI there
existed some degree of explicit or tacit collusion within the industry, the arrival
of the MNC may endanger the stability of collusion. For instance, monitoring
behaviour may become more di¢cult, particularly since the MNC has no pre-
vious “history” in the domestic market. Collusion may be re-established after
a learning period, but foreign entry is likely to disrupt collusive outcomes, at
6The existence of …xed costs is one of the determinants behind the choice of serving the
foreign market through exports or by establishing a subsidiary. In case the MNC decides for
the latter option, pricing will be determined by marginal costs (and not total costs).
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least initially. Clearly, if the ownership transfer is followed by an output expan-
sion on the part of the subsidiary, then the intensity of competition should also
increase.
It is nonetheless possible to imagine polar situations in which FDI will result
in a dampening of competitive pressures.7 FDI may lead to a crowding-out of
domestic …rms, followed by exit. In such a situation, successful predation will
only dampen competition if re-entry costs are high. Also, FDI may reduce
competition in the event that entry into the foreign market facilitates collusion.
The reason is the following: FDI may increase multi-market contact, and thus
make collusion easier to sustain (see Bernheim and Whinston (1990), and Neven
and Siotis (1993) for a discussion in the context of FDI). Last, MNCs may be
better placed to extract rents from host country governments, for instance by
successfully lobbying for protection (Wang and Blomström (1982)). While these
arguments are plausible (predation, multi-market contact, and rent seeking),
their importance is likely to be limited in practice.
2.3 Testable hypotheses
Received theory suggests that a change in ownership from domestic to foreign
should bring long-run e¢ciency and therefore pro…tability gains, especially in
industries where proprietary assets such as technology and other intangibles
are perceived to be important. However, there may also exist short-run costs
associated with the transfer of ownership, so that the sign of the short-run
e¤ect of a change in ownership is ambiguous. If both e¤ects are at work and our
assumptions on the dynamics are correct, we expect the adjustment process to
be described by an upward sloping function, possibly steeper for those industries
where proprietary assets are more important.
7As mentioned above, FDI motivated by technology sourcing is likely to leave competitive
conditions unchanged.
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As already mentioned, the long-run impact on pro…tability of MNC activ-
ity in an industry is instead unclear.8 This is the case not only because the
competitive e¤ect and the spillovers e¤ect operate in opposite directions, but
also because they are both unlikely to have only a transitory impact. In this
perspective, we will let the data rank the relative long-run importance of the
two channels. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the competitive ef-
fect is likely to become e¤ective quickly after the change in ownership, whereas
spillovers are more likely to take time to materialise.9 Again, this suggests that
the transition to the long-run impact (which can be positive or negative) should
follow an upward sloping adjustment process.10 Furthermore, this slope should
be steeper for industries where proprietary assets are important, at least to the
extent that these assets cannot be fully internalized by foreign a¢liates.
Finally, market shares, concentration and intangibles’ intensity are the stan-
dard variables which enter a pro…tability equation. Both received theory and
evidence indicate that all variables should be positively associated with prof-
itability. As it is well known, previous …rm-level studies …nd that the coe¢cient
on market share is substantially larger and more signi…cant than the coe¢cient
on market concentration (Martin, (2002)). This in turn seems to suggest that
the strong positive e¤ect of market concentration commonly found in industry-
level studies re‡ects mainly …rm characteristics that give rise to Ricardian rents,
8 Clearly, an alternative approach is to focus on what may appear at …rst sight as a clear-cut
empirical relationship. For instance, a substantial foreign presence should be positively related
with total factor productivity or labour productivity if spillovers are important. However, to
the extent that competition reduces slack, or X-ine¢ciency in an industry, an increase in
productivity is to be expected, even if spil lovers are non-existent. In such a situation, the
increase in productivity would be incorrectly attributed to spillovers. Furthermore, Aitken
and Harrison (1999) provide evidence that, contrary to priors, a large MNC presence may
reduce productivity among domestically owned concerns. This occurs when MNCs crowd-out
their host-country counterparts.
9Common examples of spillovers found in the literature include: movement of skilled
personnel, MNC subsidiaries acting as “role models” that are emulated by domestic …rms,
spillovers via common input suppliers etc... All of the above are likely to take time before
their e¤ect can be discerned in the data.
10While addressing a di¤erent issue (the e¤ect of airline mergers on prices), Kim and Singal
(1993) point out that the “e¢ciency” and “market power” e¤ects of mergers work their way
through at a di¤erent pace.
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and not the joint exercise of market power.
3 Data and variable de…nition
3.1 Data
Our results are obtained by making use of an extensive survey of …rms carried by
the Bank of Spain since 1983, gathered in the database Central de Balances.1 1
The data collected is comprehensive, each annual cross-section exceeds three
thousand observations, and it covers all sectors of economic activity (except for
…nancial institutions). This annual survey is made up of two questionnaires, one
for large …rms (number of employees greater than 100), and a shorter version
for smaller …rms.12 The data used in this paper is to be found in both ques-
tionnaires, so that the entire sample of responding …rms is available. Moreover,
the variables that we use are all ratios, so that the unavailability of sectorial
de‡ators is not a major issue.
The original data …le contains more than ninety one thousand observations
(with one observation corresponding to data pertaining to one …rm in a given
year). The data is annual, for the time period 1983-1996. Given sample size,
it is possible to impose strict …lters, aimed at eliminating extreme observations
(replies), or questionnaires for which some of the essential data is missing. The
…lters that are applied are detailed in the data appendix. The latter are those
typically used by researchers familiar withCentral de Balances (see, for instance,
Hernando and Vallés (1994)).
11 Spain’s recent experience represents an interesting case of liberalisation. In the early
1980’s, the country was still in the midst of its political transition to democracy, and the
economy had not yet been freed from the corporatist and interventionist policies of the previous
regime. Shortly after, in 1986, the country joined the European Union (EU). This led to the
progressive opening of the Spanish economy. In parallel, EU membership triggered a wave of
domestic liberalisation meant to bring the Spanish economy into the European mainstream.
Moreover, entry into the EU coincided with the most important liberalisation exercise in
Europe since the 1960’s, namely the implementation of the Single Market Programme. All
these factors contributed to a large increase in FDI in Spain.
12 In addition to the number of employee, there another two …nancial criteria (on turnover
and assets). These thresholds are periodically revised and do not a¤ect sample construction.
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Each …rm is classi…ed according to a nomenclature established by the Bank
of Spain. This a¢liation ranges from 2 digit broad sectors (26 for the whole
economy) to intermediate (3-digit, 82 sectors). In this paper, we focus ex-
clusively on manufacturing. In addition, we apply panel data techniques that
require a minimum of four consecutive observations which results in a reduction
in sample size. We dropped the few …rms that changed sectorial a¢liation, as
well as observations pertaining to 3-digit sectors with less than 100 observations
for the entire time period.1 3 The …nal sample consists of 29318 observations.
Tables 1 to 3 provide some descriptive statistics.
Insert Tables 1 to 3 about here
3.2 Variable de…nition
Our dependent variable is pro…tability, proxied by accounting price-cost mar-
gins. Accounting price-cost margins have been heavily criticised (Bresnahan
(1989)). Nonetheless, there is increasing evidence indicating that this measure
is not so ‡awed after all (Martin (2002)). Moreover, in a panel dataset, using
accounting price cost margins as proxies for economic pro…tability is adequate
as long as the bias that they incorporate is constant over time (Boone (2000)).
Last, we are con…dent that for our dataset, accounting price cost margins are
a reasonable proxy for economic pro…tability. Siotis (2003) estimates sectorial
mark-ups by applying a modi…ed version of Hall (1986) to this dataset. He re-
ports that, apart from a scaling factor, sector wide accounting margins are very
similar to mark-ups that are econometrically estimated. Typically, the correla-
tion between sectorial accounting margins and estimated mark-ups stands above
13The three digit sectors that were dropped are: tobacco (66 obs.), weapons (34 obs.), and
o¢ce equipment (63 obs.).
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0.8.
To get an accounting estimate of price cost margins, we adopt the methodol-
ogy proposed by Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986). Price cost margins
are de…ned as:
µ
p ¡ c
p
¶
it
=
µ
Value of sales+ ¢ inventories¡ payroll¡ cost of materials
Value of sales+ ¢ inventories
¶
it
where ¢ stands for “changes in”, and i and t respectively index …rms and time.
The inclusion of inventory changes ensures that adjustment for business cycle
‡uctuations are catered for in our measure of price cost margins. According
to the accounting de…nitions adopted in the Central de Balances survey, this is
equivalent to:
µ
p ¡ c
p
¶
it
= P CMit =
µ
Value added ¡ payroll
Value added+ net cost of materials
¶
it
Central de Balances includes data on foreign ownership. We have de…ned
the degree of foreign control by the percentage of foreign equity held by non-
residents. This variable is labelled FOC (“C” denoting the fact that the variable
is continuous, and ranges from 0 to 1).1 4
In order to proxy the degree the of MNC activity in a given sector, we de…ne
the following variable that we label “foreign presence”:
14We also de…ned another proxy that takes value zero if foreign equity stands below 10%,
and 1 above this threshold (10% is the usual threshold used by national statistical agencies to
determine whether the foreign company exercises e¤ective corporate control). Another dummy
is obtained by applying a correction to the 0-1 dummy. Concretely, some observations in the
database could possibly contain coding errors. For instance, some …rms report the following
yearly pattern of foreign equity: 0%, 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%, 0%, or the opposite, 100%, 100%,
0%, 100%, 100%. For these occurrences, we have generated a new dummy that adjusts the
data. That is, the …rst case has been transformed into one of zero foreign ownership, while
the second into a fully owned subsidiary. We re-ran all our estimations using these proxies
instead of FOC. The results are qualitatively very similar.
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F Pijt =
Pn
k=1;k6= i qkjt ¤FOCkjtPn
i=1 qijt
where i; j; t respectively index the …rm, sector, and time and q denotes real
sales. In words, FP measures the proportion of output that is foreign controlled
within a sector. The variable is computed at Central de Balances’ three-digit
level classi…cation. This implies that we are only able to gauge the importance
of intra-industry spillovers.
Central de Balances also provides data on the book value of intangible
assets held by …rms. We construct the variable ITGS as follows:
ITGSit =
ITG
it
qit
where ITG represents the value of intangibles. This variable serves to proxy the
degree product di¤erentiation.
Market share is de…ned as:
MSijt =
qijtPn
i=1 qijt
According to most oligopoly models, size di¤erences within an industry re-
‡ect di¤erential e¢ciency. MS is also de…ned at Central de Balances’ three-digit
level classi…cation.
Last, we constructed the 3-digit level Hirschman-Her…ndahl index of industry
concentration:
HHIjt =
nX
i=1
(MSijt)
2
14
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics pertaining to the variables that we use
in the estimation.
Insert Table 4 about here
4 Econometric speci…cation and results
4.1 Speci…cation
In order to be able to recover both the short-run and long-run e¤ects of our
variables of interest, we estimated the following autoregressive distributed lag
model:
PCM it = ¯1PCM i;t¡1 + ¯ 2MS ijt + ¯3HHI jt + ¯4ITGS it (1)
+¯5FOC it + ¯ 6FOC i;t¡1 + ¯7FOC i;t¡2
+¯8FP ijt + ¯ 9FP ij;t¡1 + ¯ 10FP ij;t¡2
+®t + ®i + vit
where ®t represents pro…tability shocks common to all …rms in a given year, ®i
is a …rm-speci…c time-invariant component (possibly correlated with the other
right hand-side variables) measuring among other things unobservable manage-
ment quality, and vit is a random disturbance.
All equations are estimated in …rst di¤erences to remove the …rm-speci…c
e¤ect ®i. A set of three-digit industry dummies is however kept in the estimation
to allow for industry speci…c linear time trends in the levels of the dependent
variable.1 5 Estimation is carried out by the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Since all regressors in our
15This speci…cation ensures that policy changes that a¤ect all …rms in a sector (such as the
elimination of tari¤s and the removal of non-tari¤ barriers to trade) are controlled for, at least
partially.
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model are likely to be correlated with the idiosyncratic component of the error
term vit , OLS (as well as GLS) estimates would be biased and inconsistent,
while GMM methodology provides consistent estimates of the parameters by
making use of appropriate instruments. In particular, under the assumption
that the idiosyncratic component of the error term, vit is serially uncorrelated
in the level equations, an error with a moving structure of order one is generated
in the equations in di¤erences, so that once-lagged variables are also correlated
with the transformed error term. However, regressors lagged twice or more will
be legitimate instruments. To check the validity of this assumption we calculate
and report tests on both …rst and second order correlation on the residuals (m1
and m2). If our assumption is correct we expect …rst but not second order serial
correlation in transformed residuals. As a more general test of misspeci…cation
we also report the Hansen-Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions.
One econometric issue which is worth commenting upon at this stage is that
recent work by Blundell and Bond (1998) has shown that the standard GMM
…rst di¤erence procedure may be prone to the weak instrument problem, es-
pecially when some of the regressors tend to be highly persistent over time.
For this reason, all equations presented in the next section have also been esti-
mated by using the so-called GMM system. Our …ndings are virtually unaltered.
However, the Sargan test strongly rejects the validity of the extra-orthogonality
conditions required for the consistency of the GMM-system estimator. For this
reason, in what follows we only comment upon the results obtained by using
the GMM …rst di¤erence procedure.
The speci…cation presented in (1) has some attractive characteristics. First,
estimation by …rst-di¤erences ensures that the results are not driven by un-
observable …rm and industry level characteristics, potentially correlated with
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some of the observables.1 6 As shown by Aitken and Harrison (1999), the pres-
ence of …xed e¤ects that are not adequately controlled for yields spurious results.
Second, the availability of potentially valid instruments provides an adequate
answer to the standard criticism directed at the “old” cross-sectional empirical
literature, namely that mark-ups, market shares and concentration are all simul-
taneously determined in most oligopoly models. Third, the dynamic structure
allows for a distinction between short-run and long-run e¤ects. As argued in
section 2.3, this dichotomy is important in the context of the research issues
addressed in this paper.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Pooled sample
Four sets of results are presented in Table 5, and for the time being, we focus
on column (i) where all three digit sectors have been pooled. Comfortingly,
second order autocorrelation is not present and the Sargan test provides evi-
dence against the endogeneity of our choice of instruments. As expected, our
control variables MS and ITGS are both positively signed even if the market
share variable is less precisely estimated (but still signi…cant at the 10% level).
Concentration is wrongly signed and nowhere near signi…cant.1 7 The estimates
for the time dummies are not reported. We simply note that the estimates are
consistent with prior, that is, these dummies do a good job of picking-up cyclical
factors. For instance, the dummies for 1992 and 1993 are signi…cantly negative,
years in which the Spanish economy was experiencing a deep recession. As for
16Note that ®i accounts for all time invariant …xed e¤ects. The latter may be idiosyncratic
to the …rm (e.g., management quality), or common to all …rms within a sector (e.g., entry
barriers or the elasticity of demand).
17 In order to check that the “usual” associations between market share, concentration and
margins were present in our sample, we re-ran our estimations withMS and HHI being treated
as exogenous. The point estimates turned out to be positive and highly signi…cant for MS,
and small and insigni…cant for HHI. We have also re-estimated equation (1) with one and two-
period lag MS and HHI ; the results are qualitatively identical. See Ravenscraft (1983) on the
relationship between concentration and margins, and Salinger (1990) for a general overview
of pro…tability estimations.
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the 3-digit industry dummies, they are not jointly signi…cant.
With respect to our central regressors, the following picture emerges. The
variable associated with the degree of foreign ownership (FOC ) indicate that
in the short-run FDI has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on pro…tability. This
contemporaneous e¤ect is negative and signi…cant at the 5% signi…cance level.
There are a number of non-competing explanations for this …nding. First, it may
be the case that becoming an MNC’s subsidiary involves real costs, particularly
in the short-run. The latter may be the result of a re-organisation process
and/or to di¤erences between the MNCs’ management style (so called “teething
problems” associated with “foreignness”). Second, the initial drop in margins
may re‡ect the tendency to endogenously in‡ate one’s results in the face of a
realistic prospect of being taken over by a multinational. Whatever the reason,
as it can be seen in Figure 1 where the adjustment path implied by our dynamic
speci…cation is pictured against time, this negative e¤ect tends to vanish over
the years, indicating that the fall in pro…tability is transient. Indeed a non-linear
Wald test con…rms that the long-run multiplier turns out to be not signi…cantly
di¤erent from zero.18 Taken at their face values, our overall results point out
that a change in ownership from domestic to foreign has no long-run e¤ect on
pro…tability, a …nding in line with those reported by Benfratello and Sembenelli
(2002). This probably goes against the common wisdom which associates foreign
ownership with higher levels of productivity or pro…tability. However, it must
be borne in mind that our results do not say that foreign controlled …rms are
not more pro…table than their domestic counterparts. This may still be the
18Concretely, a non-linear Wald test for the e¤ect of foreign ownership tests whether
¯
5
+¯
6
+ ¯
7
1¡¯1
is di¤erent from zero.
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case if, for instance, foreign owners tend to pick up the best domestic …rms
and concentrate in high mark-up sectors. What our results suggest is that
existing descriptive evidence (as well as econometric …ndings that do not address
properly all endogeneity issues) should not be interpreted as a causal relation,
possibly supporting policy measures in favour of foreign ownership.
Insert Table 5 and Figure1 about here
As for foreign presence, we …nd weak evidence that a larger foreign presence
dampens margins in the short-run, possibly because it enhances the stance of
competition. The coe¢cient on the contemporaneous variable for foreign pres-
ence (FP) is negative, but not signi…cant at conventional levels. In addition,
as it can be seen from Figure 1, this e¤ect does not persist over time. Indeed,
even if not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, the long run multiplier is positive.
These results are not inconsistent with the conjecture that MNC activity at the
industry level generate e¤ects on pro…tability that go in opposite directions, and
that are therefore di¢cult to unearth empirically.
A …rst approximation to test this hypothesis is to estimate a labour produc-
tivity equation. As mentioned earlier, there ought to exist, in general terms,
a causal link between foreign presence at the sectoral level and labour produc-
tivity if spillovers are important.19 We therefore estimated a standard labour
productivity equation that includes our two FDI variables (FOC and FP ).2 0
Comfortingly, the results are perfectly consistent with our conjectures. The
coe¢cient on the variable associated with foreign ownership at the …rm level
19Note, however, that this positive relationship is not as clear cut as it might appear at …rst
sight (see footnote 8).
20The equation we estimated consists of the log of value added per worker regressed on:
the lagged dependent variable, the log of the capital to labour ratio, sectoral median …rm size
(as a proxy for economies of scale), intangibles over sales (ITGS ), and our two FDI variables
(FOC and FP). This equation was estimated by applying the same GMM procedure as that
used to obtain our central …ndings. These additional results are available upon request.
19
(FOC ) follows the same pattern as in the pro…tability equation: an initial sig-
ni…cant drop compensated by a recovery, thus generating a zero long-run e¤ect.
This con…rms the possible existence of transitory “teething problems” that also
a¤ect labour productivity. By contrast, the results pertaining to FP di¤er signif-
icantly. The latter’s coe¢cient yield a positive long run e¤ect that is signi…cant
at the 2.5% level. These …ndings are consistent with the idea that a labour pro-
ductivity equation principally picks-up the spillover e¤ect, while a pro…tability
equation has the potential to unearth both the spillover and pro-competitive
e¤ects.
4.2.2 R&D versus non-R&D intensive industries
In what follows, we shed further light on this issue by splitting the sample
according to priors. Concretely, we expect direct technology transfers and
spillovers to be particularly strong in knowledge intensive sectors. After all,
these industries are the ones where spillovers are more likely to materialise,
and where multinationals may be expected to transfer intangibles to their sub-
sidiaries. In Central de Balances, only a subset of …rms report their R&D
spending, and the series is not available before 1986. Nevertheless, this data
enables us to construct a proxy for R&D intensity at the 3-digit level for the
period 1986-1996. Sectorial R&D intensity is de…ned as:
RDIj =
Pn
i=1 RDEijPn
i=1 qij
where RDE is R&D expenditure at the …rm level. Thus, RDI j takes a single
value for each of our 3-digit sectors. The splitting criteria that we applied to
de…ne R&D intensive sectors is an intensity greater or equal than 2%.21 Four
industries fall in this category (pharmaceuticals, electronics, precision instru-
21 Spanish …rms are among the lowest R&D spenders in the OECD area.
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ments, and aerospace), and they account for 2184 observations. Two dummies
were constructed accordingly:
½
RD = 1 if RDIj ¸ 0:02
NRD = 1¡RD if RDIj < 0:02
Both RD and NRD were interacted with FP and FOC. Three sets of results
are presented in columns (ii)-(iv) of Table 5. In column (ii), the interacted
regressors as well as industry dummies are introduced. Since the latter are not
jointly signi…cant, column (iii) presents the same speci…cation without industry
dummies. Last, in column (iv), concentration is dropped since it did not prove
signi…cant in any of the speci…cations. As before, there is no evidence of second
order autocorrelation of the errors, and the Sargan mispeci…cation tests are
satisfactory in the case of columns (ii) and (iii), but less so in (iv) (still, we
cannot reject the null at the 1% level).2 2
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here
Both ITGS and MS maintain their sign. The latter variable is less precisely
estimated, while the former remains highly signi…cant. As for the variables of
interest, the same picture emerges from all speci…cations. In non-R&D intensive
sectors, a change in ownership has no long-run e¤ect on pro…tability. However,
the pattern described previously is maintained: margins initially fall, and this
e¤ect is signi…cant at the 1% level. After one lag, margins recover, and this e¤ect
is signi…cant at the 5% level. With the 2-period lag also being positive (though
not signi…cant), the long-run e¤ect is negative, but not signi…cantly di¤erent
from zero as indicated by the Wald test and the dynamic adjustment path de-
22 It should be borne in mind that the two-step Sargan test has a tendency to over-reject
the null hypothesis of adequate instruments (see Arellano and Bond (1998) for a discussion).
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picted in Figure 2 (derived from speci…cation (iv)). Regarding foreign presence
in non-R&D intensive sectors, the contemporaneous e¤ect is signi…cantly nega-
tive in the case of columns (ii) and (iv) (while it is only so at the 15% level in
the case of speci…cation (iii)). We take this as evidence that an increase in MNC
presence increases competitive pressure in the short-run. However, with the
exception of speci…cation (iv), this e¤ect vanishes over time, as indicated by the
adjustment path and the Wald test. This is consistent with the conjecture that
FDI both increases competitive pressure and generates positive externalities for
host country …rms (see Figure 3, also derived from speci…cation (iv)).
The results for the four R&D intensive industries are signi…cantly di¤erent
from the results we …nd for the sample which includes all other industries. In
fact, the tests on the equality of the long-run e¤ects between the two samples of
industries always reject the restrictions of equal coe¢cients both for the foreign
ownership (FOC ) and for the foreign presence (FP ) variables. Also, our …nd-
ings are consistent with the predictions put forward in the testable hypotheses
section. With regard to foreign ownership, we …nd a statistically signi…cant pos-
itive e¤ect that takes time to materialise (the 2-period lag coe¢cient is the most
signi…cant). This is in line with the idea that MNCs do transfer …rm speci…c
assets to their subsidiaries in these industries, and also that there is a learning
period before these assets are successfully exploited (see also Figure 2). While
not individually signi…cant at standard con…dence levels, the coe¢cients asso-
ciated with foreign presence indicate that the long-run e¤ect on pro…tability of
MNC presence is always positive and signi…cant. This …nding suggests that the
positive spillover e¤ect dominates the pro-competitive e¤ect in the case of R&D
intensive industries.23 Furthermore, as expected, the adjustment path pictured
23We are faced with a potential identi…cation problem in interpreting these …ndings. In
the four R&D sectors that we identi…ed, it could be the case that the increase in pro…tabil-
ity experienced by domestic …rms is a by-product of an increase R&D e¤ort on their part,
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in Figure 3 is upward sloping, thus pointing out that it indeed takes time for
spillovers to materialise.
4.2.3 Competition versus spillovers in R&D intensive industries
We further explore these issues by exploiting an additional identi…cation condi-
tion. If technological spillovers are indeed present in R&D intensive industries,
we would expect domestic …rms to be the main bene…ciaries. This hypothe-
sis is motivated by the fact that Spanish …rms are more likely to lag foreign
subsidiaries. While the origin country of MNCs is unavailable in Central de
Balances, aggregate FDI …gures indicate that the main investors come from
the US and more advanced Western European economies (e.g., from France,
Germany and the UK). It is therefore likely that spillovers will primarily stem
from subsidiaries to domestic entities. Clearly, this does not preclude positive
technological externalities ‡owing across foreign subsidiaries; our conjecture is
simply that the spillover e¤ect will be felt more acutely by domestic …rms.
We therefore constructed two additional variables. First, we de…ne a foreign
and domestic dummy as:
½
DOD = 1 if FOC = 0, 0 otherwise
FOD = 1 if FOC > 0, 0 otherwise
That is, a …rm with any positive amount of equity held by non-residents is
deemed foreign owned. We then interacted these dummies with our measure of
foreign presence (FP) in R&D intensive sectors. In order to check the robustness
of our results, we also used an alternative de…nition of “foreignness”, that is:
partially spurred by the increased presence of foreign …rms. Data limitations prevent us from
directly tackling this issue. However, OECD data (ANBERD database, 2000 release) do not
suggest that Spanish …rms belonging to the four sectors labelled as R&D intensive signi…cantly
increased their R&D outlays during our sample period. The same holds true for …rms that
reported R&D expenditure in Central de Balances.
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½
DOD = 1 if FOC < 0:1, 0 otherwise
FOD = 1 if FOC ¸ 0:1, 0 otherwise
which implies that only …rms whose foreign owned equity was 10% or more are
considered as subsidiaries. These additional results are presented in Table 6. In
column (i) we applied the …rst de…nition of multinationality, while we used the
alternative measure in column (ii). As before, the traditional determinants of
pro…tability have the expected sign. As for our variables of interest, their sign,
signi…cance, and long vs. short run e¤ects are the same as before in non-R&D
intensive sectors.24 We take this as evidence that our results are robust across
speci…cations. In R&D intensive sectors, the direct e¤ect of foreign ownership
(FOC*RD) continues to positive and signi…cant in the long-run. Regarding
foreign presence, we …nd that its long-run e¤ect is positive and signi…cant for
both domestic …rms and foreign subsidiaries. However, it appears that domes-
tic …rms are the main bene…ciaries of an increase in multinational activity: the
point estimate for FP*RD*DOD is about twice as large as that of FP*RD*FOD
(see also Figure 4 where the adjustment process based on the results in column
(ii) is plotted for domestic …rms and foreign subsidiaries). These results are
consistent with the conjecture that, as compared to their foreign-owned coun-
terparts, domestic …rms belonging to R&D intensive sectors have been the main
bene…ciaries of spillovers.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted to disentangle some of the e¤ects usually
attributed to FDI. On the one hand, the fact that MNCs possess …rm speci…c
24We also re-ran our estimations by interacting the foreign and domestic dummy variables
in non-R&D intensive sectors. No marked di¤erence emerged between domestically owned
concerns and foreign subsidiaries.
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advantages that can be transferred back and forth across locations suggest that
subsidiaries ought to enjoy greater levels of e¢ciency, and therefore pro…tability.
Overall, we …nd support for this conjecture, but this is limited to R&D intensive
sectors. For the rest of manufacturing, the long-run e¤ect of a change from
domestic to foreign ownership is nil. In line with the existing literature, we do
…nd evidence of transient costs associated with a change in ownership. With
regard to the impact of foreign presence on pro…tability, the dichotomy between
R&D and non-R&D sectors is also present. For non-R&D sectors, our results
indicate that increased multinational presence dampens margins. However, this
e¤ect tends to vanish over time, a …nding that can be interpreted as evidence
that MNCs also generate positive externalities for host country …rms. This
conclusion is further supported by the results pertaining to the impact of foreign
presence in R&D intensive sectors. In the latter case, the positive spillover e¤ect
dominates, a result consistent with priors. Finally, we …nd evidence consistent
with the idea that domestic …rms belonging to R&D intensive sectors are the
main bene…ciaries of spillovers. This should come as no surprise, given that
Spanish entities are likely to lag their foreign-owned counterparts.
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Data Appendix
The data was …ltered in order to systematically eliminate observations of
dubious value.
Labour input: …rms reporting non positive values for this variable were
dropped.
Gross output: …rms reporting non-positive values for this variable were elim-
inated.
Accounting price-cost margins (PCM): observations for which this variable
took a value greater or equal to one were dropped. We also dropped margins
lower or equal than -1.
We also dropped observations that reported a negative value for net …xed
assets.
We dropped the upper and lower 0.01 percentiles of MS and PCM.
Firms that changed their 3-digit sectorial a¢liation during the sample period
were dropped from the sample.
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Table 1: Number of Consecutive Observations
Cons. Obs. Firms
4 529
5 475
6 420
7 307
8 310
9 251
10 276
11 257
12 178
13 200
14 364
Total 3567
Table 2: Number of Observations by Year
Year Observations
1983 1178
1984 1573
1985 1920
1986 2333
1987 2597
1988 2613
1989 2596
1990 2489
1991 2346
1992 2258
1993 2185
1994 1980
1995 1821
1996 1429
Total 29318
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Table 3: Number of Observations by Sector
Sector Observations
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 5833
Chemicals 3832
Mineral Products 2355
Metal Goods 2314
Mechanical Engineering 2596
Electrical and Instrument Engineering 1945
Transport Equipment 1563
Textiles and Clothing 3206
Leather and Leather Products 907
Wood and Wooden Products 911
Paper, Printing and Publishing 2373
Rubber and Plastics 1483
Total 29318
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean St. Dev. 1 Pct Med. 99 Pct
Price Cost Margins (PCM) 0:104 0:089 ¡0:155 0:098 0:360
3-digit Market Share (MS) 0:015 0:039 0:000 0:004 0:185
3-digit HH index (HHI) 0:063 0:065 0:016 0:052 0:363
Intangibles over Sales (ITGS) 0:014 0:078 0:000 0:000 0:237
Foreign Ownership (FOC ) 0:153 0:331 0:000 0:000 1:000
3-digit Foreign Presence (FP ) 0:294 0:187 0:015 0:227 0:792
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Table 5: Equation Results
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
P CMt¡1 0:445(0:00) 0:441(0:00) 0:447(0:00) 0:442(0:00)
MSt 0:275(0:08) 0:252(0:13) 0:242(0:17) 0:161(0:36)
HHIt ¡0:013(0:87) 0:047(0:53) 0:126(0:20)
ITGSt 0:098(0:00) 0:098(0:00) 0:098(0:00) 0:096(0:00)
FOCt ¡0:084(0:03)
FOCt¡1 0:080(0:01)
FOCt¡2 0:012(0:15)
F Pt ¡0:031(0:26)
F Pt¡1 0:014(0:54)
F Pt¡2 0:032(0:09)
FOCt ¤ RD 0:058(0:11) 0:042(0:31) 0:053(0:20)
FOCt¡1 ¤ RD 0:055(0:22) 0:040(0:39) 0:046(0:34)
FOCt¡2 ¤ RD 0:046(0:07) 0:044(0:09) 0:043(0:11)
FOCt ¤ NRD ¡0:125(0:01) ¡0:125(0:01) ¡0:133(0:01)
FOCt¡1 ¤ NRD 0:100(0:01) 0:092(0:02) 0:090(0:03)
FOCt¡2 ¤ NRD 0:009(0:34) 0:007(0:46) 0:006(0:50)
F Pt ¤RD 0:051(0:21) 0:036(0:38) 0:031(0:43)
F Pt¡1 ¤ RD 0:021(0:52) 0:050(0:31) 0:118(0:12)
F Pt¡2 ¤ RD 0:080(0:11) 0:043(0:32) 0:048(0:31)
F Pt ¤NRD ¡0:050(0:07) ¡0:045(0:15) ¡0:078(0:07)
F Pt¡1 ¤ NRD 0:014(0:60) ¡0:001(0:97) ¡0:042(0:43)
F Pt¡2 ¤ NRD 0:017(0:28) 0:015(0:30) 0:007(0:66)
m1 ¡14:82(0:00) ¡14:23(0:00) ¡14:35(0:00) ¡14:01(0:00)
m2 1:47(0:14) 1:39(0:16) 1:48(0:14) 1:40(0:16)
Sargan 140:79(0:17) 190:67(0:08) 193:09(0:06) 182:88(0:01)
Test on joint sig.of ID 32:49(0:39) 36:05(0:24)
FOC LR e¤ect 0.011(0:77)
RD FOC LR e¤ect 0.284(0:03) 0.228(0:12) 0.254(0:08)
Non-RD FOC LR e¤ect -0.029(0:62) -0.047(0:42) -0.066(0:28)
Test on FOC restriction 0.313(0:06) 0.275(0:07) 0.320(0:01)
FP LR e¤ect 0.027(0:64)
RD FP LR e¤ect 0.272(0:08) 0.234(0:10) 0.353(0:05)
Non-RD FP LR e¤ect -0.045(0:53) -0.056(0:45) -0.203(0:08)
Test on FP restriction 0.317(0:02) 0.290(0:07) 0.556(0:04)
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Note: All estimates include a full set of time dummies as regressors and instru-
ments. Estimates in columns (i) and (ii) also include a set of three-digit industry
dummies as regressors and instruments. Additional instruments are:
in column (i) PCM (2,3), MS (2,3), HHI(2,3), ITGS(2,3), FOC(2,3), FP(2,3);
in columns (ii) and (iii)PCM (2,3),MS (2,3), HHI(2,3), ITGS (2,3), FOC*RD(2,3),
FOC*NRD(2,3), FP*RD (2,3), FP*NRD(2,3);
in column (iv) PCM (2,3), MS(2,3), ITGS (2,3), FOC*RD (2,3), FOC*NRD(2,3),
FP*RD(2,3), FP*NRD(2,3).
P-values in round brackets. The null hypothesis that each coe¢cient is equal to
zero is tested using one-step robust standard errors. m1(m2) is a test of the null
hypothesis of no …rst (second) order serial correlation. Sargan is a test of the validity
of the overidentifying restrictions based on the e¢cient two-step GMM estimator.
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Table 6: Additional Equation Results
(i) (ii)
P CMt¡1 0:439(0:00) 0:439(0:00)
MSt 0:197(0:28) 0:213(0:24)
HHIt
ITGSt 0:097(0:00) 0:094(0:00)
FOCt ¤ RD 0:064(0:22) 0:079(0:19)
FOCt¡1 ¤ RD 0:076(0:19) 0:065(0:30)
FOCt¡2 ¤ RD 0:048(0:20) 0:051(0:19)
FOCt ¤ NRD ¡0:133(0:01) ¡0:132(0:01)
FOCt¡1 ¤ NRD 0:093(0:03) 0:093(0:02)
FOCt¡2 ¤ NRD 0:007(0:46) 0:007(0:46)
F Pt ¤ RD ¤ FODt ¡0:002(0:96) ¡0:028(0:66)
F Pt¡1 ¤RD ¤FODt¡1 0:092(0:15) 0:098(0:17)
F Pt¡2 ¤RD ¤FODt¡2 0:042(0:44) 0:037(0:51)
F Pt ¤ RD ¤ DODt 0:039(0:51) 0:059(0:37)
F Pt¡2 ¤RD ¤DODt¡1 0:133(0:17) 0:127(0:21)
F Pt¡2 ¤RD ¤DODt¡2 0:053(0:31) 0:056(0:28)
F Pt ¤ NRD ¡0:078(0:07) ¡0:076(0:08)
F Pt¡1 ¤NRD ¡0:038(0:48) ¡0:035(0:51)
F Pt¡2 ¤NRD 0:008(0:62) 0:008(0:60)
m1 ¡14:14(0:00) ¡14:15(0:00)
m2 1:39(0:16) 1:39(0:17)
Sargan 191:67(0:05) 193:98(0:04)
RD FOC LR e¤ect 0:335(0:02) 0:348(0:01)
Non-RD FOC LR e¤ect ¡0:059(0:33) ¡0:056(0:34)
Test on FOC restriction 0:394(0:01) 0:404(0:01)
RD FP DOD LR e¤ect 0:401(0:06) 0:431(0:03)
RD FP FOD LR e¤ect 0:225(0:11) 0:191(0:20)
Test on RD FP restriction 0:169(0:32) 0:240(0:16)
Non-RD FP LR e¤ect ¡0:193(0:10) ¡0:184(0:11)
Note: in column (i) FOD is equal to one if FOC>0, and zero otherwise. In column
(ii) FOD is instead equal to one if FOC>0.1, and zero otherwise. All estimates include
a full set of time dummies as regressors and instruments. Additional instruments are:
PCM (2,3), MS(2,3), ITGS(2,3), FOC*RD (2,3), FOC*NRD(2,3), FP*RD*FOD(2,3),
FP*RD*DOD(2,3),FP*NRD(2,3).
P-values in round brackets. The null hypothesis that each coe¢cient is equal to
zero is tested using one-step robust standard errors. m1(m2) is a test of the null
hypothesis of no …rst (second) order serial correlation. Sargan is a test of the validity
of the overidentifying restrictions based on the e¢cient two-step GMM estimator.
34
-0 .1000
-0 .0800
-0 .0600
-0 .0400
-0 .0200
0 .0000
0 .0200
0 .0400
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Figure 1: Aggregate Dynamic E¤ect on Pro…tability of Foreign Ownership (dot-
ted line) and Foreign Presence (continuous line)
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Figure 2: Dynamic E¤ect on Pro…tability of Foreign Ownership - R&D (contin-
uous line) versus non-R&D (dotted line) Intensive Industries
-0 .3000
-0 .2000
-0 .1000
0 .0000
0 .1000
0 .2000
0 .3000
0 .4000
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Figure 3: Dynamic E¤ect on Pro…tability of Foreign Presence - R&D (continu-
ous line) versus non-R&D (dotted line) Intensive Industries
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Figure 4: Dynamic E¤ect on Pro…tability of Foreign Presence in R&D Intensive
Industries - Domestic Firms (continuous line) versus Foreign Firms (dotted line)
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